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Abstract 
 
In a Bertrand duopoly model, it is shown that an anti-dumping regulation can 
be strategically exploited by the domestic firm to reduce the degree of 
competition in the domestic market. The domestic firm commits not to export 
to the foreign market which gives the foreign firm a monopoly in its own 
market. As a result the foreign firm will increase its price allowing the 
domestic firm to increase its price and its profits. If the products are 
sufficiently close substitutes then the higher profits in the domestic market are 
large enough to compensate for the loss of profits on exports. 
 
Keywords: anti-dumping regulations, Bertrand oligopoly, strategic behaviour. 
JEL classification: F13, L13. 
 1
1. Introduction 
While tariffs, import quotas and other barriers to trade have been reduced or eliminated 
by the WTO/GATT, there has been a proliferation of anti-dumping regulations with more 
countries using anti-dumping regulations. Prusa (2005) argues that anti-dumping regulations 
do more harm than the problem of economically harmful predatory dumping that they are 
supposed to remedy, and that anti-dumping regulations are now just a clever form of 
protectionism. Anti-dumping regulations were supposed to be a response to anti-competitive 
behaviour by foreign firms that engaged in predatory dumping to eliminate competition from 
firms in the home market. The widespread use of anti-dumping regulations and the rarity of 
instances of predatory dumping suggest that this argument cannot be used to justify anti-
dumping regulations. There is now a real risk that anti-dumping regulations are having 
unintended consequences with them being used strategically by firms in the home market for 
anti-competitive reasons. 
This paper will show how the home firm can strategically use an anti-dumping regulation 
to lessen competition in the home market by committing not to export to the foreign market. 
In a Bertrand duopoly model, with differences in the size of the market in the home and 
foreign country, when there is no anti-dumping regulation both firms compete in both 
markets and there is no dumping. When there is an anti-dumping regulation the home firm 
could commit not to export to the foreign market thereby giving the foreign firm a monopoly 
in the foreign market. Since the anti-dumping regulation prevents the foreign firm from 
setting a lower price in the home market than in the foreign market, it induces the foreign 
firm to increase its price in the home market and allowing the home firm to increase its price. 
Although the home firm gives up its profits from exports to the foreign market if the products 
are close substitutes then it recoups this loss from the higher profits in the home market. The 
behaviour of the firm induced by the anti-dumping regulation has an anti-competitive effect 
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in the home market and the welfare of the home country is reduced by the anti-competitive 
effect and the loss of the profits from exports. 
Although the example of strategic use of anti-dumping regulations in this paper is novel, 
a number of authors have looked at the possible effects of anti-dumping regulations on 
competition; see: Staiger and Wolak (1992), Prusa (1992, 1994), Webb (1992), Reitzes 
(1993), Anderson, Schmitt and Thisse (1995), Veugelers and Vandenbussche (1999), 
Pauwels, Vandenbussche and Weverbergh (2001), and Falvey and Wittayarungruangsri 
(2006). 
 
2. The Bertrand duopoly model 
A home firm and a foreign firm produce differentiated products and compete as Bertrand 
duopolists in the home and foreign markets as in Clarke and Collie (2003). The two firms 
have identical and constant marginal cost, and there are no transport costs. The two markets 
differ in terms of the size of the markets, but the degree of product differentiation and the 
maximum willingness to pay are the same in both markets. The markets are assumed to be 
segmented. Given the assumptions of segmented markets and constant marginal cost, each 
market can be analysed independently of the other market under free trade. Variables relating 
to the home market will be denoted by a subscript h while those relating to the foreign market 
will be denoted by a subscript f, and variables relating to home firm will be denoted by a 
subscript one while those relating to the foreign firm will be denoted by a subscript two. In 
the jth market, where ,j h j= , the price set by the home firm is 1 jp  and its sales are 1 jx  
while the price set by the foreign firm is 2 jp  and its sales are 2 jx . 
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In each market, there is a representative consumer with quasi-linear preferences that are 
described by a quadratic utility function. The utility function of the representative consumer 
in the jth market is: 
 ( )2 21 2 1 2 1 21 2 ,2j j j j j j j j jU x x x x x x z j h fα α β φ= + − + + + =  (1) 
where jz  is consumption of the numeraire good which is produced by a perfectly competitive 
industry using constant returns to scale technology. The parameters of the utility function are 
assumed to satisfy the following conditions: the maximum willingness to pay of consumers 
exceeds the marginal cost of the firms, 0c> >α ; and the products of the two firms are 
imperfect substitutes, 0 1≤ <φ . It turns out that φ  is a key parameter in the model that 
measures the degree of product substitutability, where 1=φ  means that the products of the 
two firms are perfect substitutes and 0=φ  means that the two products are independent. The 
other key parameter turns out to be the size of the foreign market relative to the size of the 
home market: h f≡λ β β . Utility maximisation, subject to the budget constraint, yields the 
inverse demand functions facing the two firms in the jth market: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 2j j j j j j j jp x x p x xα β φ α β φ= − + = − +  (2) 
In a Bertrand duopoly, where price is the strategic variable of the firms, the direct 
demand functions will generally be more useful than the inverse demand functions; inverting 
(2) yields the direct demand functions in the jth market: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 1 22 21 11 11 1j jj jx p p x p p= − − + = − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦− −α φ φ α φ φβ φ β φ  (3) 
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These demands show that the size of the jth market is proportional to 1 jβ , and therefore 
h f≡λ β β  is the size of the foreign market relative to the size of the home market. The 
profits of the two firms from sales in the jth market are: 
 ( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2j j j j j jp c x p c x= − = −π π  (4) 
Under free trade, there is a Bertrand duopoly in both markets with the two firms 
independently and simultaneously setting prices to maximise profits; hence, assuming there is 
an interior solution where both firms sell positive quantities, the first-order conditions for the 
Bertrand equilibrium in the jth market are: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 22
1
2
1 22
2
1 1 2 0
1
1 1 2 0
1
j
j j
j j
j
j j
j j
p p c
p
p p c
p
π α φ φβ φ
π α φ φβ φ
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − − + + =⎣ ⎦∂ −
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − + − + =⎣ ⎦∂ −
 (5) 
These first-order conditions can be rearranged to give the best-reply functions of the 
home and the foreign firm in the jth market: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 2 2 2 2 1 11 11 12 2j j j j j j j jp b p c p p b p c p⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= ≡ − + + = ≡ − + +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦α φ φ α φ φ  (6) 
Figure one shows the Bertrand duopoly best-reply functions of the two firms, and allows 
for the possibility of boundary solutions where one firm has zero sales; see Clarke and Collie 
(2003) for further explanation of the best-reply functions. The intersection of the two best-
reply functions, labelled as B in figure one, gives the prices of the two firms in the symmetric 
Bertrand equilibrium under free trade in the jth market: 
 ( )1 2 12B Bj j
c
p p
− += = −
α φ
φ  (7) 
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Note that since the Bertrand equilibrium prices do not depend upon the market size 
parameter jβ , prices will be the same in both markets so there is no dumping under free 
trade. Substituting these prices (7) into the direct demand functions (3) yields the sales of the 
two firms in the Bertrand equilibrium under free trade: 
 ( )( )1 2 2 1B Bj j j
cx x −= = − −
α
β φ φ  (8) 
Using these prices (7) and quantities (8) in (4) yields the profits of the two firms in the 
Bertrand equilibrium under free trade: 
 ( )( )( ) ( )
2
1 2 2
1
2 1
B B
j j
j
c− −= = − +
φ απ π β φ φ  (9) 
Note that the sales and profits of the two firms in each market do depend upon the 
market size parameter, jβ . 
The welfare of the home country is given by the sum of consumer surplus, the profits of 
the home firm in the home market, 1hπ , and the profits of the home firm from exports to the 
foreign market, 1 fπ . Given the quadratic utility function, consumer surplus in the home 
country is 2 21 1 2 2 1 2 1 22 2h h h h h h h h h h hCS U p x p x z x x x xβ φ⎡ ⎤= − − − = + +⎣ ⎦ . Thus, the welfare of the 
home country is: 
 2 21 2 1 2 1 122
h
h h h h h h fW x x x x
β φ π π⎡ ⎤= + + + +⎣ ⎦  (10) 
Substituting (8) and (9) into (10) yields the welfare of the home country under free trade: 
 ( )( )( )
2
12 1
B B
h f
h
c
W
α πβ φ φ
−= +− +  (11) 
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The first term is the sum of consumer surplus and the profits of the home firm in the 
home market while the second term is the profits of the home firm from exports to the foreign 
market. These results under free trade will be used as a benchmark in the analysis of the 
effects of an anti-dumping regulation in the next section. 
 
3. Anti-Dumping Regulation 
This section analyses the export decision of the home firm in the presence of an anti-
dumping regulation imposed by the home government that instantaneously levies a duty on 
the foreign firm if it dumps its product in the home market (i.e. it sets a lower price in the 
home market than in the foreign market). The anti-dumping duty is set equal to the dumping 
margin, which is defined as the difference in price of the foreign product between the foreign 
and the home market. Faced with such an anti-dumping regulation, the foreign firm will 
never dump in the home market as it is always more profitable to increase the price it sets in 
the home market to avoid the anti-dumping duty. Thus, the anti-dumping regulation deters 
the foreign firm from practising price discrimination between the home and foreign markets, 
and alters the game played by the two firms. 
The formal structure of the two stage game is as follows: At the first stage of the game, 
the home firm decides whether or not to export to the foreign market. At the second stage, if 
the home firm decides to export, then there is a subgame where the two firms compete in the 
home and foreign markets. If the home firm decides not to export, then there is a subgame 
where the foreign firm has a monopoly in the foreign market while the two firms compete in 
the home market with the anti-dumping regulation deterring the foreign firm from setting a 
lower price in the home market than in the foreign market. As usual the game is solved by 
backwards induction to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
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In the subgame, where the home firm has decided to export to the foreign market, the 
foreign firm will not want to price discriminate between the two markets. Therefore, the 
outcome will be as in the Bertrand duopoly equilibrium described in the previous section. In 
both markets, the prices are given by (7), the sales by (8) and the profits by (9). Thus, the 
total profits of the home firm from the two markets are 1 1
B B
h fπ π+ . The anti-dumping 
regulation does not alter the outcome of the subgame when the firms simultaneously and 
independently set prices in both markets. 
In the subgame, where the home firm has decided not to export to the foreign market, the 
foreign firm will have a monopoly in the foreign market while competing in a Bertrand 
duopoly with the home firm in the home market, and the home government’s anti-dumping 
regulation will deter the foreign firm from setting a lower price in the home market than in 
the foreign market. The foreign firm can either set a price higher than the Bertrand duopoly 
price and sell in both markets or set the monopoly price and sell only in the foreign market. 
This will affect competition between the two firms in the domestic market as it will alter the 
best-reply function of the foreign firm. 
Since the foreign firm has a monopoly in the foreign market, its demand curve is found 
by setting 1 0fx =  in its inverse demand function (2), and inverting to obtain 
( )2 2f f fx p= −α β . In the home market, the foreign firm competes with the home firm in a 
Bertrand duopoly so its demand is given by its inverse demand function (3). As the anti-
dumping regulation prevents the foreign firm from setting a lower price in the home market 
than in the foreign market, it must set the same price in both markets so 2 2 2f hp p p= = . The 
total profits of the foreign firm are the sum of its profits from the foreign market and its 
profits from the home market: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )22 2 2 2 1 221 11f h hf h
pp c p p
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟Π = + = − + − + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
απ π α φ φβ β φ  (12) 
Assuming there is an interior solution where the foreign firm sells positive quantities in 
both markets and the home firm sells a positive quantity in the home market, then the first 
order condition for profit maximisation by the foreign firm is: 
 ( ) ( )2 2 1 222
2 1 1 2 0
1 hf h
p c p p c
p
∂Π − += + − + − + =⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∂ −
α α φ φβ β φ  (13) 
The first term is the marginal effect on profits of a price increase in the foreign market 
and the second term is the marginal effect on profits of a price increase in the home market. 
The first term is positive as the foreign firm could increase its profits in the foreign market by 
raising its price, while the second term is negative as the foreign firm could increase its 
profits in the home market by reducing its price. Solving (13) yields the profit-maximising 
price of the foreign firm as a function of the price set by the home firm in the home market: 
 ( ) ( )( )12 2 1 212 1h fh f h
p
p a p c
α φβα β β φ
⎡ ⎤−= ≡ + −⎢ ⎥+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (14) 
where ( )2 1ha p  is the best-reply function of the foreign firm when there is an interior solution. 
Alternatively, there may be a boundary solution where the sales of the foreign firm in the 
home market are zero. Then, the foreign firm will set the monopoly price in both markets, 
( )2 2 2Mfp p c= = +α , sell the monopoly output in the foreign market, ( )2 2Mf fx c= −α β , but 
sell zero in the home market, and earn monopoly profits in the foreign market, 
( )22 4Mf fc= −π α β . The foreign firm will compare the profits from selling in both markets, 
which depends upon the price set by the home firm, with the profits from setting the 
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monopoly price and selling zero in the home market, and then choose the most profitable 
option. 
The best-reply functions of the two firms are shown in figure two. When the home firm 
sets a low price in the home market, *1 1h hp p< , the best response of the foreign firm is to set 
the monopoly price in which case its sales in the home market will be zero. When the home 
firm sets a high price in the home market, *1 1p p> , the best-reply function of the foreign firm 
is given by ( )2 2 1hp a p= . The best-reply function of the home firm is unchanged by the anti-
dumping regulation. Assuming that the intersection of the two best-reply functions occurs to 
the right of the discontinuity in the foreign best-reply function at *1p , there will be a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium that is given by the intersection of the best-reply function of the 
home firm, ( )1 1 2h hp b p=  from (6), and the best-reply function of the foreign firm, 
( )2 2 1hp a p=  from (14). Solving for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium prices yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1
2
2
1 1 2 2 2 1
1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
D
h f h f h
D
f h f h
p c
p c
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − + + + − + + + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∆
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + + + + + + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦∆
α φ β φ β φ φ φ β β φ
α φ β φ β φ β φ β φ
 (15) 
where ( )( )2 24 1 3 0f h f∆ ≡ + − + >β β φ β φ  and the superscript D denotes the pure-strategy 
Nash equilibrium with the anti-dumping regulation. Substituting these equilibrium prices into 
the demand functions (3) yields the sales of the home firm in the home market and the sales 
of the foreign firm in two markets: 
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( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1
2 3
2
2
2
2 2
1
2 2 3
1
2 1
D
h f h
D
h f h
D
f f h
f
c
x
c
x
c
x
− ⎡ ⎤= + + + −⎣ ⎦+ ∆
− ⎡ ⎤= + + − −⎣ ⎦+ ∆
− ⎡ ⎤= + + −⎣ ⎦∆
α β φ β φ φφ
α β φ β φ φφ
α β φ β φβ
 (16) 
Substituting these equilibrium prices and sales into profits (4) yields the profits of the 
home firm from the home market and the total profits of the foreign firm from the two 
markets with the anti-dumping regulation: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
22
1 2
2
2
2 2 2 2
2 2
1
2 2 1
1
D
h f h
h
D D D
h f f h
f h
c
c
− ⎡ ⎤= + + + −⎣ ⎦+ ∆
− ⎡ ⎤Π = + = + + +⎣ ⎦+ ∆
απ β φ β φ φβ φ
απ π β φ β φβ β φ
 (17) 
In this Nash equilibrium, labelled as D in figure two, both firms set a higher price than in 
the symmetric free-trade Bertrand equilibrium, labelled as B in figure two, and the foreign 
firm clearly sets a higher price than the domestic firm since D is above the diagonal. There 
will only be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if it is more profitable for the foreign firm to 
sell in both markets rather than being a monopolist selling only in the foreign market. This 
will be the case if the size of the foreign market relative to the size of the home market is less 
than some critical value: Pλ , where this critical value is obtained by solving 2 2D MfπΠ = , 
which yields: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
32 3 4 5 2
2 2 3
32 52 12 11 3 3 1 2 2 3
16 1 2 4
P − + + − − ± + + − += + − + +
φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φλ φ φ φ φ  (18) 
At the first stage of the game, the home firm decides whether or not to export to the 
foreign market. If it decides to export then the home firm will earn the Bertrand equilibrium 
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profits in both markets, 1 1
B B
h fπ π+ , whereas if it decides not to export then it will earn higher 
profits in the domestic market, 1
D
hπ  but zero profits in the foreign market. Hence, the home 
firm will decide not to export to the foreign market if 1 1 1
D B B
h h f> +π π π . This will be the case if 
the size of the foreign market relative to the size of the home market is larger than some 
critical value: πλ , where this critical value is obtained by solving 1 1 1D B Bh h fπ π π= + , which 
yields: 
 
( )( )
( )( )
2 3 4 5 3 2 3
2
32 32 16 8 7 1 32 48 15
32 1 1
− + + − − + − + − + − += + −
π φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φλ φ φ  (19) 
The two critical values for the size of the foreign market relative to the size of the home 
market are plotted in figure three. There will be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium if Pλ λ<  
and it will be profitable for the home firm to choose not to export to the foreign market if 
πλ λ> . This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: There will be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in prices if P<λ λ , and 
the home firm chooses not to export to the foreign market if > πλ λ . 
By choosing not to export to the foreign market, the home firm gives the foreign firm a 
monopoly in the foreign market and the anti-dumping regulation prevents the foreign firm 
from price discriminating between the two markets. As a result, the foreign firm will set a 
higher price in the home market than under free trade and this will increase the profits of the 
home firm in the home market. From figure three it can be seen that choosing not to export to 
the foreign market will be profitable for the home firm when the products are close 
substitutes. When products are close substitutes, competition is intense under free trade and 
lessening competition by choosing not to export to the foreign market is profitable for the 
home firm. Note that the foreign market has to be small relative to the home market to ensure 
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that a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists, but the products being close substitutes is most 
important for choosing not to export to be profitable for the home firm. 
The effect of the anti-dumping regulation is to increase the prices of both firms in the 
home market. The effect on the sales of the two firms in the home market can be obtained by 
subtracting (8) from (16), which yields: 
 ( )( )
( )( )
( )
22
1 1 2 2
2
0 0
2 2
D B D B
h h h h
cc
x x x x
− −−− = > − = − <− ∆ − ∆
α φα φ
φ φ  (20) 
In the home market, the anti-dumping regulation increases the sales of the home firm and 
decreases the sales of the foreign firm. With the anti-dumping regulation, the home firm no 
longer exports to the foreign market and therefore the effect of the anti-dumping regulation 
on the total sales of the home firm in the two markets is: 
 ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )2 3 21 1 1 4 2 4 1 01 2D B Bh h f f hf
c
x x x
− ⎡ ⎤− + = − − − + − <⎣ ⎦+ − ∆
α β φ φ β φβ φ φ  (21) 
Hence, although there is an increase in the sales of the home firm in the home market and 
the profits of the home firm, the loss of the export sales in the foreign market means that 
there is a decrease in the total sales of the home firm. 
The welfare of the home country with the anti-dumping regulation is obtained by 
substituting sales (16) and profits (17) into welfare (10), and this yields: 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( )( )
2
2 22 2 2
2
2
2 2 2 1 1 16 12
2 1
1 2 8
D
h f h
h
f h
c
W
− ⎡= + − + − + − −⎣+ ∆
⎤+ − + − ⎦
α β φ φ β φ φ φ φβ φ
β β φ φ φ
 (22) 
The effect of the anti-dumping regulation on the welfare of the home country is obtained 
by subtracting welfare under free trade (11) from welfare with the anti-dumping regulation: 
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 ( ) ( )( )
2
12
1
0
2 2
D B B
h h f
c
W W J
− −− = − − <− ∆
α φ φ πφ  (23) 
where ( ) ( )( )2 22 4 1 8 10f hJ ≡ − + + − −β φ β φ φ φ . Note that when 1=φ , ( )6 0f hJ = − >β β , 
since 1h f≡ <λ β β  when there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and its derivative 
( )24 2 22 3 0f hJ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = − + + + <⎣ ⎦φ β φ β φ φ  for 0φ ≥ , hence 0J >  for [ ]0,1∈φ . Therefore, 
both the first and the second term in (23) are negative so the welfare effect of the anti-
dumping regulation is unambiguously negative. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: When there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, P<λ λ , and the 
home firm chooses not to export to the foreign market, > πλ λ , the anti-dumping regulation 
will have an unambiguously negative effect on the welfare of the home country. 
The first term in (23) is the anti-competitive effect of the anti-dumping regulation on the 
sum of consumer surplus and the profits of the home firm in the home market. Although the 
anti-dumping regulation increases the sales of the home firm in the home market, any 
positive profit-shifting effect is more than offset by the negative effect on consumers of the 
higher prices set by the home firm and the foreign firm. The second term is the anti-export 
effect of the anti-dumping regulation on profits from exports to the foreign market. Since the 
anti-dumping regulation leads the home firm not to export to the foreign market, this effect is 
equal to the loss of profits from exporting to the foreign market under free trade. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper has demonstrated the possibility that a firm may strategically exploit an anti-
dumping regulation to reduce competition in its home market in a situation where dumping 
would not occur without the strategic behaviour of the firm. By committing not to export to 
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the foreign market, the home firm gives the foreign firm a monopoly in the foreign market 
and an incentive to increase its price in the foreign market. However, the anti-dumping 
regulation prevents the foreign firm from dumping in the home market so it has to set the 
same price in both markets. Hence, the foreign firm will be induced to increase its price in the 
home market thereby lessening competition with the home firm and allowing the home firm 
to increase its profits if the products of the two firms are close substitutes. The welfare effect 
of the home firm strategically committing not to export to the foreign market is 
unambiguously negative due to the anti-competitive effect in the home market and the loss of 
profits from exports to the foreign market. This shows that anti-dumping regulations may 
have effects on trade and competition even when there is no complaint about dumping and no 
anti-dumping duties. Even modern mercantilists may be concerned by the loss of profits from 
exports to the foreign market as a result of the anti-dumping regulation. 
The paper has only considered the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game between 
the two firms in the presence of the anti-dumping regulation. This exists provided the foreign 
market is small relative to the size of the home market. Otherwise there will be a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium but, as the objective of this paper is to show the possibility of 
strategic behaviour by the home firm, the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium has not been 
analysed as the possibility of strategic behaviour by the home firm can be shown most clearly 
in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. 
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Figure One: Bertrand duopoly reaction functions
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Figure 3: Critical values for pure-strategy Nash equilibrium
